Introduction
The distribution of goods is the essence of politics, and the electoral connection with distributive spending is regarded as axiomatic. This often means that parties will target distributive spending on collective goods, though they may be seen to benefit core groups, such as the middle classes or working classes, that the parties in power are seen to represent. Some spending will be more narrowly focussed at particular groups, such as a specific industry or sector. Given the geographic nature of constituencies, we also expect, and do see that some particularistic spending is geographically targeted. But the existence, extent and beneficiaries of geographically targeted spending are the subject of some debate.
Foremost it was thought that such spending will be higher in countries with single member districts, though it might be expected to occur in countries using other candidate-based electoral systems which have incentives to legislators garnering a personal vote. Despite these theoretical expectations, evidence of geographically-targeted spending (hereafter GTS) aimed at electoral gain has been found around the world regardless of electoral system. Australia (Denemark 2000) , Brazil (Ames 2001 (Ames , 1995 , Canada (Milligan and Smart 2005) , England (John, Ward, and Dowding 2004) , France (Cadot, Röller, and Stephan 2006) , Germany (Stratmann and Baur 2002) , India (Dasgupta, Dhillon, and Dutta 2001) , Japan (Thies 1998; Horiuchi and Saito 2003) to Scandinavia (Tavits 2009; Dahlberg and Johansson 2002) among others, all have geographically targeted spending. The absence of empirically-supported explanations of cross-country variation 1 would suggest the theoretical basis for geographically targeted spending is not fully developed.
If the electoral system is thought to cause the existence and extent of GTS, then another literature attempts to explain where GTS goes. It has been asked whether the key explanatory factor is the legislators' desire to consolidate their core vote or the party's attempt to attract swing voters. McGillivray (2004: 18) argued that the different explanations can be resolved by considering another variable, party strength. Where parties are strong, in that legislators follow the direction of party leaders, the party will target marginal districts so as to maximise the party's power in the legislature. If parties are weak, individually powerful legislators will secure benefits for their own districts at the expense of the party nationally.
This assumes that the party or legislators will be the mechanism through which GTS is distributed. However, in most parliamentary democracies governments are much more powerful than legislatures. Following theoretical work on US committees which suggest that idiosyncratic legislative rules should help determine where particularistic spending is targeted , we argue that decision-making structures matter. Specifically we test the hypothesis that in parliamentary democracies with weak 1 There is limited empirical literature explaining the extent of geographically targeted spending (Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002 is a possible exception).
parliaments, government decision-making structures will determine the direction of GTS.
By adding the decision-rule as an independent variable, we test the rival explanations on Ireland, a country whose electoral system, political culture and party system would lead us to expect to see high levels of GTS. But Ireland's governmental institutions tend to give a good deal of autonomy to ministers. Using data on two programmes, in sports grants and school building grants, that are easily linked to constituencies, but which vary in the discretion given to ministers, we can see that GTS is potentially neither directed at core voters nor swing voters. We find that the institutional decision rules account for more variation in the direction of GTS than either marginality or party support. Furthermore the variation in the key independent variable, the decision-rule governing the allocation of spending, varies with that spending.
Theories of partisan spending
The literature on geographically-targeted partisan spending emerged from work on localism in US politics, the personal vote and the need to cultivate the district (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984; Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Key 1949) . Explanations for pork-barrelling behaviour focus on the different incentives among electoral systems to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995 Cox and McCubbins (1986) ask whether politicians direct resources to their core supporters, to the opposition or to swing voters and find that politicians will favour those voter blocs that promise higher rates of return on their policy investment. These higher rates are invariably associated with core supporters, easily identified from previous voting behaviour. A different perspective, based on persuasion and conversion rather than mobilisation of core voters, was laid out by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) , who offer a stylised theoretical account arguing for the logic of targeting swing voters they assert that the expected electoral return of any given transfer is maximised when outlays are directed at swing voters. Transfers to loyal supporters or to committed opposition voters cannot be expected to affect voting choices, as these voters' choice is generally between abstention and voting for their party.
Thus there are competing expectations. The Cox and McCubbins model predicts that core supporters will be targeted whereas Linbeck and Weibull's theory suggests that swing voters will be targeted. Both theories have been corroborated in different research nd generally results have been mixed.
Studies of distributive benefits in the US find that parties target pork projects to swing districts (Bickers and Stein 1996; Stein and Bickers 1994) , while other studies find a bias toward core supporters (Ansolabehere et al. 2007; Levitt and Snyder 1995) . McGillivray (2004) potentially resolves these seemingly conflicting hypotheses by specifying under which party system each is likely to occur.
The specific outcome is due to interaction of the electoral system with the party type, specified as the strength or weakness of the party or party leaders to impose direction on legislators (McGillivray 2004: 45) . In strong-party systems the electoral organisation is controlled by parties, not by candidates.
Elected representatives toe the party line, voting in parliament with the party when directed. Coalitions are durable and the political actor is the party in government. By contrast, in weak-party systems individual legislators are more important in policy formulation and are less beholden to their party for their political survival. Coalitions are temporary and fluid. The continual need to build temporary coalitions means GTS is added to omnibus legislation in exchange for support for the core part of the legislation. Weak parties lead to the expectation that bills receive support from both sides of the House (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981 Adapted from Golden & Picci (2008: 273) McGillivray ignored the different impact on incentives produced by open list and transferable vote systems, which heighten intra-party competition (competition between co-partisans on the same ticket), increasing the need to cultivate a personal vote and potentially reducing the impact of national party oriented policy, which lifts all co-partisans. Golden and Picci (2008) found that, in Italy from , where an open-list PR system generated high levels of intra-party competition and factionalism, the effects of particularistic policy were significant and measurable. financial transfers as they expected, but they are silent on the causal mechanism through which 'senior' legislators can direct spending to their districts.
The institutional rules that allow pork to be distributed are of utmost importance. In the US it was found that legislators in more influential committee positions are often more successful in targeting their home districts with additional funds, through their agenda setting powers . And generally we see fiscal transfers are linked to institutional rules (Baron and Ferejohn 1989) . For instance Hallerberg and Marier (2004) found that the decision rule has an impact on budgetary spending in Latin America. But, except in the US, the mechanisms through which GTS is delivered are ignored. We argue that these could be of more importance than the electoral system incentives. If in many countries GTS is given to parliament to deliver, this could increase the power of senior Only by looking at the decision-making structure and the incentives of those in decision making positions in more detail can we make reasonable predictions about the destination of GTS.
The Irish case
This paper argues that both the Irish electoral and party systems provide incentives towards a personalized delivery of distributive funds. As is well known the electoral system, PR with the Single Transferable Vote (PR-STV)
incentivises intra-party competition and personal vote gathering (Marsh 2007 ). The electoral organisation tends to be local, at the individual level, and so government TDs may rebel if their constituency is being subject to specific measures which will harm it, and when the opposition puts down motions designed to expose divisions in the government parties. Despite this we can think of the parties as strong in the sense that TDs (MPs) will almost invariably vote with their party whip (Gallagher 2010) . Relying solely on the
McGillivray's analysis we would expect that GTS would go to party strongholds, or those constituencies where support for the governing parties is high. As constituency magnitude is small -each has between three and five seats and the mode is four -there is a less than perfect proportionality, which means it is possible for parties to target particular seats. This means we can think of some seats as marginal. If we add the nature of decision-making, however, we may get a different or at least a refined sense of the direction of GTS.
A localist political culture and small programmatic differences between parties make for highly personalised campaigns. Electoral competition tends to manifest itself in terms of promoting and working within one's community and acting as a broker between the constituency and the administrative system. This is enabled by the small size of constituencies. Each TD represents just over 20,000 people, but in 2007 between 7,000 and 8,000 first preference votes were usually enough to see a candidate elected (Gallagher 2008: 79) .
One candidate was eventually elected building on just 939 first preference votes, but this was highly unusual. In most constituencies where more than one candidate runs for a party, the party will divide the constituency geographically (Weeks 2008 Within government, Irish ministers are sometimes considered to be given a good deal of autonomy (Farrell 1994) . The rules of government decisionmaking as set out in the Cabinet Handbook (Taoiseach 2006: 19) The major restriction on ministerial autonomy is not the Cabinet, which is a decision-affirming institution, but the Taoiseach Within a 'sub-head', once a scheme or programme is established, ministers usually have discretion as to where money goes, subject to compliance with procedural requirements and departmental advice, the latter of which can be over-ruled. The schemes used in this study are subheads of the estimates, and so ministers have discretion over spending, but will be conscious of the need to satisfy the Minister for Finance. Crucially there is variation in the type of schemes where the responsible minister has much more discretion in sports allocation grants than in education grants because education grants are subject to specific rules and because the objective need for investment in education varies greatly. Furthermore most funding decisions that would be typical of GTS in other countries are not subject to parliamentary or even cabinet approval, but are completely within the gift of the minister.
Fellow ministers and TDs can lobby a minister to achieve spending in their own constituencies. For ministers with leadership ambitions this may mean that funds will be transferred to the constituencies of supportive TDs. But even decisions which would otherwise have been made can be presented as favours to TDs who in turn present the allocation as having resulted from lobbying. Letters between TDs and ministers are frequently published and presented to voters in election literature. TDs are sometimes allowed to communicate the decision to relevant groups and constituents before the decision is formally communicated by the government department. The need to have prospective legislation approved by cabinet colleagues might mean that ministers will submit to cabinet colleagues' requests. Even allowing for these restrictions, ministers will be expected to and so have a strong incentive to deliver spending to their own constituency.
So where in presidential systems with weak parties, legislators are the primary political actors, in parliamentary systems with strong or weak parties, the decisive actor is determined by institutional rules as much as any other factor. This leads to the following three competing hypotheses for Ireland, the first of which we expect to find evidence for:
1. Responsible ministers will direct higher levels of expenditures or more benefits to their home constituencies, and those of other influential ministers, the Minister for Finance and the Taoiseach, where they have discretion. Where ministers have more discretion, relatively more money will be targeted at these constituencies; 2. Governing parties will direct higher levels of expenditures or more benefits to areas of greater electoral strength, i.e. to party strongholds.
3. Governing parties will direct higher levels of expenditures or more benefits to areas of greater volatility, i.e. to swing voters.
Data and Methods
In general, scholars of particularistic spending have tended to focus on infrastructure spending or social welfare policy, or indeed locally targeted discretionary grants such as sports grants (Denemark 2000 Grants was set up in 1988 funded exclusively from National Lottery income.
It was initially a multi-annual scheme, but since 1998 it has been allocated annually. For these monies the National Lottery Act (1986) gives the Minister for Finance discretion to decide the amount that will go to for each 'purpose', i.e. sports, arts etc., but these funds are then left to relevant departments for disbursal. Since 2005 the scheme is also funded through the normal 'Vote' allocated by the Dáil for each Department's expenditure. Though there are criteria for the disbursal of funds, these are vague, and the minister has the ultimate decision. The fund was soon subject to controversy and there was an The central empirical strategy is to regress per capita spending for each policy area by each electoral district and year on measures of political factors, together with economic and demographic controls that may influence 5 These two datasets are thus entirely new sources for scholars and will be made available by the authors.
funding decisions. Stein and Bickers (1994) argue that the number of grants rather than the level of grant are a more appropriate dependent variable.
However, given the structure of the data where any one project can be the recipient of a large number of grants, as parts of the project are allocated monies in successive years, we prefer to use the overall amount as the key variable of interest in this instance.
The variables used are set out in Table 1 . Our major expectation is that the variables that capture the political actors who control the decision-making process will be significant. The decision-rule variables are dummies which capture whether the constituency was represented by the relevant minister, the finance minister, the Taoiseach or any other cabinet minister. The variables designed to test for the party core and swing voter models measure the percentage support for the main government party (Fianna Fáil) 6 ; and marginality -how close Fianna Fáil as to winning or losing a seat. 7
In addition, we control for the various socio-demographic features of the constituencies in which the investments are made. These include the number of residents in the constituency, the proportion of the population under 18, and voter turnout. Unemployment expressed in terms of the proportion of adults registered as unemployed and the proportion of adults educated to a 6 We excluded small coalition parties because they are captured by the cabinet minister variable. When included in the model they were not shown to be significant. 7 Other variables, the Fianna Fáil seat proportion and whether Fianna Fáil had lost or gained a seat in the constituency were also used, but these were not significant and were removed because of multicollinearity. Considine et al. (2008) implied.
Estimation and Results
We present results of two sets of models, one spending on sports as the dependent variable and the other with money spent on schools buildings as the dependent variable. 8 The main independent variables of theoretical interest are those measuring the political influence of legislators in constituencies, these are the dummies for the Minister for Finance and
Minister for Education or Sports as well as the dummy for all Cabinet
Ministers as a whole. Also of interest is that which measures the strength of the governing party's vote in each constituency thus testing the core voter hypothesis. A variable which captures the swing voter hypothesis is included (see description in Table 1 ).
The expectation is that the signs on the variables measuring the powerful cabinet ministers will be positive (see Table 1 ). The hypotheses are tested cumulatively, so GTS directed at core voters, or party strongholds is tested first for its significance on its own; then the marginal voter hypothesis is 8 Visual inspection implied that the model suffers from non-constant variance of the residuals. Thus we report robust (Huber/White) standard errors, as these are less likely to mislead about the significance of the independent variables. We utilise the log of the grant variable as the data is skewed by outliers tested, following by the decision-rule hypothesis. All three competing hypotheses are then tested against each other. Results appear as Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively in Tables 2 and 3 . indicates that larger constituencies attract more pork, presumably because they apply for more grants.
Model 2 tests the marginal voter hypothesis proposed by Linbeck and
Weibull. The variable measuring marginality is also insignificant. This is surprising in that neither of the standard explanations appear to be important in accounting for the variation in the amount of GTS delivered to individual constituencies in particular years. Our theoretical expectations are that the decision rule is most important: Model 3 tests for this with dummy variables for the relevant ministers. The results are both positive and highly significant and the model shows constituencies of the decision-making ministers do significantly better than other constituencies. Recall that these data include changes in personnel in both departments, and controls for demographic variables. So the explanation is unlikely due to an idiosyncratic minister or that that their constituencies were most needy. The sign relating to their other colleagues in cabinet is not significant, which is not surprising as ministers may equally want to respond to demands from backbenchers. This provides evidence against any idea of cabinet log-rolling; a pattern that persists in the full model. Thus there is strong corroborating evidence for the hypothesis that the interests of the individually powerful ministers will prevail over those of the party as a whole. In terms of the raw amount of funding delivered (using unlogged grant allocations) we can see in the full sports model that the constituency of the Finance Minister can expect some €1.25 million in additional funding each year while the constituency of the Minister for Arts, Sport & Tourism can expect almost €600,000. In contrast the constituency of other cabinet ministers will generally receive over €140,000 less in sports capital funding. In primary school capital funding the constituency of the Minister for Education will receive about €1 million in additional annual funding while the constituency of the Minister for Finance will receive about €3.5 million additional funds. 9
9 These figures derive from an analysis of the raw amount of funds as the dependent variable as in the sports model. We report these figures as it is difficult to interpret the log derived coefficients in the table above. Both models produced similar results with only small changes in significance levels.
Discussion
Pork-barrel politics is thought of as the product of opportunity structures and incentives in the electoral and party systems within which parties and individual politicians seek to win and maintain power. Many works tend to disregard the decision-making rules or have simplifying assumptions with regard to them. The Irish candidate-centred electoral system, strong party unity and its localist political culture make it an ideal case for testing theories of partisan particularistic spending. There are reasons to expect GTS is important and that everything else being equal this would be targeted at marginal constituencies. But Ireland also has a dominant executive (controlled by the governing parties) with ministers who are all legislators seeking reelection. There are strong competing incentives for spending, so where it ends up is of theoretical interest. The result is that, GTS is sometimes in the gift of the powerful politicians or ministers who control the decision-making structures and are not primarily used as rewards or carrots for party supporters. Because we have two types of programmes which vary in the discretion given ministers we can further test if the decision rule is important.
Thus we can say, at least in this area, the interests of individual ministers trump the interests of the ruling party. Other legislators are only able to signal to voters that they had influence though the use of parliamentary questions.
This of course leaves open the question of whether delivery such funds is associated with garnering more votes at subsequent elections than rival candidates from the same party who do not have the ability to distribute pork 29 locally. Another puzzle is why the parties do not act in a more concerted effort to maximise seat share. These are obvious next steps in further research.
Having studied the geographic distribution of resources to Irish constituencies from 2002-2007 we find that districts which elect powerful decision making cabinet ministers win additional capital investments.
However, the governing party is not always successful at winning additional funds for their core voters or for the districts which elect non-decision-making ministers. Thus the decision-rules for the allocation of resources are the first factor that scholars should look at. Only when these have been taken into account can we assess the validity of studies testing whether core or swing voters are the primary target of partisan spending.
